Sorenson\u27s Ranch School and Shaun Sorenson v. Reta D. Oram Director, State of Utah, Deparment of Human Services, Office of Licensing : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Sorenson's Ranch School and Shaun Sorenson v.
Reta D. Oram Director, State of Utah, Deparment
of Human Services, Office of Licensing : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dale P. Eyre; Taylor, Eyre; Attorney for Appellee.
Carol L. C. Verdoia; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Sorenson's Ranch School v. Oram, No. 20000993 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2994
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SORENSOM'S RANCH SCHOOL and 
SHAUN SORENSON, 
Appellees, 
v. 
RETA D. ORAM, DIRECTOR, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF LICENSING 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20000993-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER PRESIDING 
CAROL L. C. VERDOIA (#5049) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4 666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF UTAH 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6™ FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 140833 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0833 
DALE P. EYRE (#7193) 
TAYLOR & EYRE, P.C. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES 
175 NORTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 728 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
F*1" 1 
FlUED 
<mn 1 3 ?ooi 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SORENSON'S RANCH SCHOOL and 
SHAUN SORENSON, 
Appellees, 
v. 
RETA D. ORAM, DIRECTOR, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF LICENSING 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20000993-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER PRESIDING 
DALE P. EYRE (#7193) 
TAYLOR & EYRE, P.C. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES 
17 5 NORTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 728 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
CAROL L. C. VERDOIA (#504 9) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF UTAH 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6TH FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 140833 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0833 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE NO. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 62A-4a-413 REQUIRES A FACTUAL DETERMINATION 
THAT A FELON PROVIDES CHILD CARE SERVICES BEFORE 
EMPLOYMENT IS PROHIBITED 7 
II. RECENT LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS ILLUSTRATE THE 
INTENT OF SECTION 413 12 
III. AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE REQUIRES STRICT 
INTERPRETATION NOT POLICY MANIPULATION 16 
IV. THE STATE MISINTERPRETS THE STATUTE AND THE TRIAL 
COURT RULING WITH ITS "SUPERFLUOUS" ARGUMENT 19 
CONCLUSION 23 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE NO. 
CASES 
Stevens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (1997) 17 
STATUTES AND RULES 
UCA §62A-4a-413 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 
UCA §62A-2-108 7 
UCA §62A-4-514 13 
UCA §53A-6-101 15 
UCA §26-21-1 15 
Utah Admin. Code R-501-14-1 18 
Utah Admin. Code 501-14-2 19, 19 
Utah Admin. Code 501-14-4 18, 19 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SORENSON'S RANCH SCHOOL and 
SHAUtl SORENSON, 
Appellees, 
RETA D. ORAM, DIRECTOR, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF LICENSING 
Appellant 
Case No. 20C00993-CA 
Priority No. 1^ 
BJUF.K n|.' APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant's statement of jurisdiction is correct 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
Does Utah Code Ann. §62A-4a-413 require a factual 
determination that a convicted felon provides one of five specified 
child care services before employment at the facility is 
prohibited? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant's statement of the applicable standard of review is 
correct. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. §62A-4a-413 (Supp. 2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As a "youth program", Sorenson's Ranch School ("Sorensons") is 
subject to the licensing requirements of UCA §62A-4a-413. Section 
413 is designed to require criminal background screening of all 
persons associated with youth programs, and then to determine 
whether convicted felons (and misdemeanants) provide any of the 
specified services for children in the facility. Section 413(2) 
prohibits felons from providing any child care services to children 
in the facility. 
Shaun Sorenson is employed by Sorenson's and has a felony 
record for DUI with accident/injury. This record was revealed by 
the criminal background screening conducted by the Office of 
Licensing pursuant to Section 413.However, Licensing has refused to 
perform the second step of determining whether Shaun Sorenson 
provided any of the services for children listed in Section 413 
before requiring his termination. Instead, Licensing proceeded 
under the interpretation that they are not required to make that 
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determination or provide hearings to any convicted felons 
associated with youth programs. The Plaintiffs appealed to the 
district court which granted summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiffs on grounds that Shaun Sorenson provided none of the 
prohibited services and therefore his employment need not be 
terminated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sorenson's is a residential treatment program for troubled 
youth. (R. 1-6) It is also part of a larger corporation involved in 
other kinds of business endeavors. Burnell Sorenson is the founder 
and owner of Sorenson1s and the Defendant Shaun Sorenson is his 
son. In 1992, Shaun Sorenson was convicted of two felonies in the 
state of California for DUI with accident/injury and hit and run 
from the same incident. (R. 1-6,10-11) Subsequently, Shaun 
Sorenson moved back to Utah to work for the family business. (R. 1-
6) A plumber by trade, he performs maintenance and construction 
work. (R. 66-67) He provides no counseling, teaching or supervision 
of the students at Sorenson's. (R. 66-67) Most recently he 
constructed homes in a new subdivision, (R. 66-67) 
Pursuant to the laws governing the licensing of youth 
programs, Sorenson''s listed Shaun Sorenson as an employee of the 
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school. (R. 1-6) A criminal background screening conducted by the 
Office of Licensing produced the felony convictions and the State 
issued a Notice of Agency Action on January 30, 1998. (R. 10-11) 
The Notice required either the termination of Shaun Sorenson's 
employment or revocation of Sorenson's license. (R. 10-11) The 
Plaintiffs requested a hearing to challenge the State's 
determination that Shaun Sorenson actually provided services 
prohibited by Section 413(2). (R. 13-16) Pursuant to agency 
policy, the Office of Licensing then filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing Request on the basis that there were no disputed issues of 
fact due to its interpretation of the statute that all felons are 
prohibited from any association with youth programs. R. 12) On 
February 18, 1998, an Order Dismissing Defendant's Hearing Request 
was issued by an officer of the Office of Administrative Hearings 
"because the Defendant was convicted of an offense which prevents 
him from being employed in a licensed facili-ty." (R. 13-16) The 
Plaintiffs filed a Request for Reconsideration on the grounds that 
there had never been a finding and adjudication that Shaun Sorenson 
provided any of the services prohibited by Section 413(2). (R. 17-
19) On March 18, 1998, the hearing officer reversed her prior 
decision and issued an Order Granting Defendant's Request for 
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Reconsideration concluding that there was an issue of fact whether 
Shaun Sorenson was an employee "who provides services or care to 
children." (R. 17-19) 
Despite this order, a second hearing officer requested briefs 
from the parties then denied the Plaintiffs' request for an 
evidentiary hearing by concluding that no felons could be employed 
by Sorenson's in any capacity. (R.7-9) The Plaintiffs appealed to 
the district court seeking de novo review of the agency action. (R. 
1-6) The State filed a motion requesting summary judgment on the 
grounds that as a convicted felon, Shaun Sorenson could not be 
employed at Sorenson's "in any capacity." (R. 35-48) The Plaintiffs 
objected and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that Shaun Sorenson's employment was prohibited only if he 
provided one of the services listed in Section 413(2). (R. 49-65) 
The district court denied the State's motion and granted the 
Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 85-87) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As conceded by the State in its brief, this appeal involves 
the interpretation of a statute that is neither ambiguous or 
inconsistent. By its own designation, Section 62A-4a-413 governs 
the licensing of "[a]gencies and individuals providing services to 
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children." (See title to UCA §62A-4a-413.) It requires a two-part 
screening test for such agencies and individuals to identify and 
prohibit convicted criminals from providing the specified services 
to children. 
The first part of the screening, found in Section 413(1), is 
used to identify any persons associated with the agency. It is a 
broad and expansive test listing six (6) different associations an 
individual may have with the agency. Any person having one of 
these associations with the agency must be disclosed to the Office 
of Licensing for a criminal background check. Any person with a 
criminal history is subject to the second screening test. The 
second part, found in Section 413(2) for felonies and 413(3) for 
misdemeanors, requires the State to determine whether a convicted 
person provides any of five (5) enumerated services for children in 
the facility. If the person provides such services, their 
employment must be terminated. 
In an attempt to streamline and simplify their legislative 
mandate, the State Office of Licensing has eliminated the second 
part of the screening procedure. The reason is that it is easier 
to prohibit all felons from any contact with child care agencies. 
But in doing so, the State has violated important employment rights 
6 
and compromised the integrity of the licensing system established 
by the Legislature. In the name of protecting children, the State 
argues for its interpretation. As shown below, the State's policy 
does nothing to improve upon a comprehensive screening procedure 
which is effective if administered properly in the manner 
envisioned by the Legislature. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 62A-4a-413 REQUIRES A FACTUAL DETERMINATION THAT A 
FELON PROVIDES CHILD CARE SERVICES BEFORE EMPLOYMENT IS PROHIBITED 
Chapter 4a of Title 62A governs child and family services. 
Private agencies and individuals providing such services are 
required to be licensed by the state and to follow strict 
guidelines. One of those requirements concerns reporting the names 
of all persons associated with the facility . Pursuant to UCA § 
62A-4a-413 (1), licensed facilities must submit the names and 
identifying information for each and every individual employed by 
or associated with the facility in one of six different capacities: 
(1) (a) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private agency 
or individual licensed by the department to provide child 
placing services, youth programs, substitute, foster or 
institutionalized care to children shall, in order to 
obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-108, submit 
to the department the name and other identifying 
information, which may include fingerprints, of new and 
proposed: 
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i. owners; 
ii. directors; 
iii.members of the governing body; 
iv. employees; 
v. providers of care; 
vi. volunteers, except parents of children enrolled in 
the programs. 
Utah Code Ann. §62A-4a-413(1)(a). 
There are no exceptions to this reporting requirement. Every 
single person associated with the facility in one of these 
capacities must be disclosed to the state for screening and 
criminal background checks. This is the first requirement or the 
first test, and it is separate and distinct from any other 
requirement. The purpose of Subsection (1) is to report and screen 
all persons associated with the facility. Thus, it is a screening 
requirement The child care agency discloses all persons who meet 
one of the six (6) classifications of persons associated with the 
facility. Only if they can be classified in one of these 
capacities and have a criminal history, do we proceed to the second 
test contained in Subsection (2) . The fact that a facility is 
required to report all persons with criminal histories who are 
associated with the program does not automatically translate into 
a prohibition against employment. Subsection (1) is only a 
reporting requirement to determine the type of association and 
8 
criminal history of persons associated with a licensed facility. 
It contains no prohibitory language. 
Instead, Subsection (2) of 413 provides the actual regulation 
of employment in licensed facilities. It states: 
(2) An owner, director, member of the governing body, 
employee, provider of care or volunteer who has a felony 
conviction may not provide child placing services, foster 
care, youth programs, substitute care or 
institutionalized care for children in facilities or 
programs licensed by the department. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-413(2). Subsection 2 requires the Office 
of Licensing to determine whether any person identified in 
Subsection 1 as a convicted felon actually provides one of the 
child care services at the facility before any action is taken. 
This is the second test or "services" test. The strict prohibition 
is that they may not provide one of the five (5) enumerated 
services which are: child placing services, foster care, youth 
programs or substitute or institutional care. Licensing must 
investigate and determine whether the convicted person actually 
provides any of those services. This is also consistent with the 
policy and purpose of the statute. The statute does not prohibit 
all contact, association or employment. The plain language of 
Subsection 2 is dispositive on this issue. It uses the express 
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language "may not provide" and lists five kinds of services, then 
limits the services to those being provided "in facilities or 
programs licensed by the department." There can be a vast 
difference between an employee providing child care services in the 
facility and other types of employees. 
For example, a part-time custodian is employed by a day-care 
to mow the lawn and clean the building on weekends. The custodian 
was convicted of poaching a goose fifteen years ago. This is a 
felony under federal law and Section 413 provides no distinction 
between the types of felonies. The facility would be denied a 
license or the custodian would be denied employment because of this 
fifteen year old felony which is expungable only by presidential 
pardon. Another example, a boy's ranch raises alfalfa hay as part 
of its program and hires a longhaul trucker to ship the baled hay 
throughout the year. The ranch?s license could be revoked because 
the truck driver, whose only contact with the ranch is loading his 
truck, was convicted of graffiti-vandalism five years ago. That is 
a third degree felony and under the interpretation proposed by the 
State, there is no exception despite the fact that neither person 
may ever speak to a child at the facility let alone provide 
services to the children. The statute provides for a determination 
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whether individuals with criminal convictions are actually 
providing services to children. The State is attempting to 
eliminate this step of the statutory procedure in order to 
streamline and simplify its own procedures at the expense of the 
associations and of the employment of others who provide no 
services to children. 
The absurdity of the State's interpretation is illustrated by 
the instant case. Consider the following scenarios. Shaun 
Sorenson has moved back to Utah to work for his father. He will 
build houses to sell but will also provide plumbing and maintenance 
services to the School. Under the State's interpretation, Shaun 
would be prohibited from providing any services of any kind to the 
School If he received a pay-check and was considered an employee, 
then his employment in any capacity would be prohibited. Moreover, 
his father would risk revocation of his license to operate if he 
paid Shaun a dime for work at the School It gets worse. 
What if Shaun had decided to stay in California and work as a 
plumber but, because of advancing age, his father makes Shaun and 
his other children shareholders in the family corporation which 
includes Sorenson's Ranch School. Section 413 requires that all 
"owners, directors or members of the governing board" be disclosed 
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to the State for criminal background checks. Under the State's 
interpretation, Shaun could not hold a corporate office, 
directorship or even own a single share in the business his father 
and family have built. And this restriction is not temporary. As 
a felon not entitled to expungement under California law, Shaun 
could never own or be involved with his family business for the 
rest of his life short of a governor's pardon which is all but 
impossible. 
It is simply inconceivable that the State Legislature intended 
such a result. The second part of the screening procedure in 
Section 413 would easily prevent such an absurd result. This is 
the reason that the prohibitive language of Section 413 is 
contained in subsections (2) and (3). It specifically prohibits 
convicted criminals from providing child care services in the 
facility or program. It is not a blanket prohibition restricting 
all employment and association of any kind. 
II. RECENT LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS ILLUSTRATE THE INTENT OF SECTION 
413 
The Legislature's intent to limit the prohibition to only 
those persons providing child care services can be seen in a recent 
amendment to Section 413. Subsection 3 of Section 413 governs 
misdemeanor convictions which are, as opposed to felonies, within 
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the discretion of the department to allow convicted misdemeanants 
to provide child services. The current version of Subsection 3 
reads as follows: 
With regard to an owner, director, member of the 
governing body, employee, or provider of care who has a 
misdemeanor conviction, the executive director has 
discretion to determine whether or not that person may 
provide any child placing, foster care, youth programs, 
substitute care, or institutionalized care for children 
in a facility or program licensed by the department. 
Utah Code Ann. §62A-4a-413 (3) . As shown below, the Legislature 
intentionally inserted the word "provide" which is the same 
language as Subsection 2. More importantly, the Legislature removed 
more specific language prohibiting all "employment" of convicted 
criminals. The earlier version of Subsection 3 read as follows: 
With regard to an employee or provider of care who has a 
misdemeanor conviction, the executive director has the 
discretion to determine whether or not that person may be 
employed by any child care, child placing, foster care, 
substitute care, or institutionalized care for children 
in a facility or program licensed by the department. 
Utah Code Ann. §62A-4-514 (1991 Supp.). 
The Legislature intentionally deleted the phrase "be employed 
by" and substituted the word "provide." The plain meaning is 
obvious: instead of this prohibition applying to all persons 
"employed by" the licensed facility, the Legislature modified the 
language to apply to and prohibit only those individuals providing 
13 
services to children. Why would the Legislature make such an 
explicit and detailed change if this was not their intent? More 
importantly, why did the Legislature amend Subsection 3 to make it 
consistent with Subsection 2 if the intent was not the same: to 
limit the prohibition to those persons providing services? If the 
intent were to prohibit all employment or association, it would be 
expected that the Legislature would have made the reverse 
modification so that Subsection 2 was consistent with Subsection 3 
and prohibit all "employment" without exception. Instead, the 
Legislature mandated that the agency make a second determination. 
Not only must the convicted person be an employee (status test) but 
they must also be an employee who provides child care services 
(services test) . The state agency simply does not want the burden 
of performing the second test as required by statute. They do not 
have the power or authority to disregard and ignore a statutory 
mandate. 
If the Legislature had intended licensed facilities to have no 
employees or associations with convicted felons, it could have 
easily written a statute explicitly prohibiting such contact. More 
importantly, if that had been the Legislature's intent, it would 
not have eliminated language with that precise effect, "employed 
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by", and substitute, less restrictive language, "provide" services. 
To prohibit all employment, associations and contact on the basis 
of any felony conviction is too broad, over-inclusive and 
unreasonable. In fact, under the State's interpretation, it would 
be easier for Shaun Sorenson to get a job at a public school, see 
UCA §53A-6-101 et. seq., or in a pediatric hospital, see UCA §26-
21-1 et. seq. The State contends that every employee provides a 
benefit to the children and on that basis alone, they should be 
prohibited. But the statute requires that they provide one of five 
enumerated child care services, not just a benefit. The State also 
attempts to actually change the standard to any persons who may 
ever have access to the children. There is no support whatsoever 
for this interpretation of the statute. In fact, the StateTs 
argument actually frustrates the intent of the Legislature. 
Metaphorically, Section 413 was meant to enlarge the net but 
sort out the fish. If applied correctly, the statute accomplishes 
this goal. For example, Section 413(1) requires that all persons 
associated with the licensed facility in the listed capacities be 
disclosed. This is the "net" capturing any person associated with 
the facility who may have a criminal conviction. Subsection (2) 
then sorts or identifies those persons with criminal histories who 
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actually provide one of the enumerated services to children. It is 
those persons who are prohibited from having any association with 
the licensed facility. The State's argument is based on an alleged 
distinction between the terms "employee" and "provider of care". 
The State contends that the use of both terms has some significance 
other than the enlargement of the screening pool as shown above. 
Both terms were necessary because some employees provide services 
to the children in the youth program but are not "providers of 
care." Including both terms ensures that all persons are screened. 
It does not obviate the need to perform the "services" test. 
III. AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE REQUIRES STRICT INTERPRETATION NOT 
POLICY MANIPULATION. 
Statutes cannot be applied and administered at the whim and 
fancy of each governmental agency. For this reason, there are very 
explicit rules of statutory construction which are followed by the 
courts when interpreting statutes. The Utah Supreme Court 
explained these rules as follows: 
When faced with the question of statutory construction, 
we look first to the plain language of the statute . . 
we assume that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, 
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable. Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's 
plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative 
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history or relevant policy considerations. 
Stevens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 
(1997) (Citations omitted). The State's argument violates these 
principles of statutory interpretation. The State argues that 
policy considerations should be used to interpret an unambiguous 
statute and thereby change its plain meaning. This is improper. 
The statute is clear, concise and unambiguous. The State 
speculates that liabilities will be increased and criminals will 
have more access to children without the strict and narrow 
interpretation advanced by the State. However, neither of these 
propositions are true if the Office of Licensing administers the 
statute as written. 
To enhance prevention of child abuse and close doors to 
potential perpetrators, the Legislature enacted Section 413 to 
require disclosure of any persons associated with a licensed 
facility and criminal screens for all such individuals. Because 
this procedure is intentionally over-inclusive, the administering 
agency was required by Subsection 2 to determine which of all the 
individuals with criminal convictions actually provide services to 
children and should be removed from the facility. On a case-by-
case basis, more scrutiny and focus can be employed to review 
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potential perpetrators of many different crimes acting in many 
different capacities. The large reporting net will also identify 
sexual offenders who have failed to register with law enforcement 
or who are prohibited from contact with children by parole or 
probation conditions. The reasoning and purpose of the statute are 
sound. The procedure and process are effective. It is the State's 
interpretation and implementation that are flawed. The mindless 
application of a statute can lead to the complete disruption of a 
legislatively mandated procedure. 
The policy manipulation by the State is illustrated by the 
rules promulgated by the agency itself. Prior to this action, 
administrative rules for the Office of Licensing prohibited felons 
from providing "services to children." In effect, the State had 
interpreted Section 413 to prohibit felons from providing "services 
to children" not prohibiting all association or employment. A 
sample of the original administrative rules read as follows: 
R-501-14-2 Definitions. "Employee" means a person who 
works in, volunteers in a program to provide direct 
services for children in a licensed provider facility. 
R-501-14-4 Results of Screening. (B) Denial: A person 
convicted of a felony shall not be employed to provide 
services for children. 
Utah Admin. Code R-501-14-1, 501-14-2, and 501-14-4. Following the 
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filing of this action, the rules were modified to reflect current 
State policies or political agendas. 
R-501-14-2 Definitions. "Employee" means a person who 
performs services for a licensee in a paid or otherwise 
compensated capacity. 
R-501-14-4 Results of Screening. (B) Denial: 1. A 
licensee or a person associated with a licensee convicted 
of a felony shall not be given a background screening 
clearance required to provide services for the licensed 
program serving children. 
These rules, which were the State agencyfs interpretation and 
administration of the statute, are entirely consistent with the 
enabling legislation. The same procedure and standard as the 
statute are applied by the original rules. The statutory language 
and intent are clear and unambiguous. Persons with felony records 
may not provide services for children. They can mow the lawn, 
build a garage or fix cars in the shop but they cannot provide 
actual services to the children. This is the standard. That is 
the statutory mandate. Any further interpretation is a perversion 
of the law established by the Legislature. 
IV. THE STATE MISINTERPRETS THE STATUTE AND THE TRIAL COURT RULING 
WITH ITS "SUPERFLUOUS" ARGUMENT 
Repeatedly the State claims that any interpretation other than 
a blanket prohibition of employment of felons would render Section 
413 meaningless and superfluous: "the requirement to check the 
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criminal background of an employee becomes superfluous if only the 
criminal background of a provider of care is pertinent." This 
statement and argument are the result of a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the screening procedure set out in Section 413. 
As explained herein, the first section cf 413 is a broad and 
over-inclusive reporting requirement. Obviously, it is important 
to know the criminal histories of any person associated with child 
care. The State confuses the issue by asking why the terms 
"employee" and "provider of care" are listed together. The reason 
they are listed together, with four other categories, is to enlarge 
the reporting and screening pool to any and all persons who may be 
associated with a child care agency. It is not, as the State 
contends, a redundant reporting requirement because both employees 
and providers of care may provide child care services. 
The flaw in the State's understanding and application is when 
they try to reconcile the terms listed in 413(1) with the 
prohibited services in 413(2). Why, the State asks, would 
employees be listed in 413(1) with providers of care when only 
persons providing services to children are prohibited from 
employment in 413(2). The answer is simple. In some cases there 
will be employees, owners, directors, etc. who provide child care 
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services in addition to their position as employee, owner or 
director, etc. If only a "provider of care" was listed in 413 (1), 
perhaps an owner or director may not view themselves as required to 
disclose themselves and be subject to a criminal background check 
because they are not a teacher, therapist, counselor, chaperon, 
supervisor, nurse or other person who may be a "provider of care/' 
The logical extension of the State's interpretation shows that 
it is not reasonable or necessary. If the State's interpretation 
is upheld and a plumber such as Shaun Sorenson is forced to leave 
the employ of Sorenson's, how can he be stopped from providing the 
same plumbing and maintenance services to the school as an 
independent contractor. The answer is that he cannot be prohibited 
from providing such services because the screening statute, Section 
413, never intended to prohibit his employment whether as an 
employee or independent contractor. As an independent contractor, 
he would not fit any of the classifications listed in Section 413 
(1) and therefore he would not be required to disclose himself to 
the Office of Licensing for a criminal background check. Also, 
since he is an independent contractor, the School would not be 
required to disclose his name or address. The State's 
interpretation elevates form over substance to allow Shaun Sorenson 
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to do indirectly what he cannot do directly. It makes no sense and 
the distinction serves no purpose. 
More importantly, does Section 413 really create such an 
obvious loophole? Of course it doesn't because whether Shaun 
Sorenson provides maintenance services to the School as an employee 
or as an independent contractor, he provides no child care 
services in the facility. Under the proper administration of 
Section 413, the result is the same regardless of how and by whom 
the plumbing is fixed at Sorenson's. On the other hand, Section 413 
would prohibit an independent contractor from working directly with 
the children as a teacher or counselor because that contractor 
(just like some employees) is providing child care services. The 
title and very first sentence of Section 413 clearly impose the 
same disclosure and screening requirements upon any individuals who 
"provide" any of the child care services listed which would include 
independent contractors. 
The State has attempted to inflame the issue on appeal by 
raising the specter of child molesters posing as janitors and 
custodians. As shown above, an independent contractor can avoid all 
screening requirements and still work within a facility or program 
providing child care services. If the State's "potential access to 
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children" is the standard, then we should start screening all 
independent contractors who work for child care agencies (e.g. 
construction, plumbing, electrical, accounting, legal) as well as 
the mailman, meter reader, delivery truck driver ad infinitum. Or, 
we can simply apply the statute as written to those persons who 
actually provide the child care services specifically listed and 
enumerated by the Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 62A-4a-413 is a straight-forward and unambiguous 
screening statute for the licensing of child care facilities. It 
is remarkably effective in screening all persons and prohibiting 
criminals from providing child care services. In a climate of 
acute child protection, the Office of Licensing is attempting to 
make the laws instead of administer them. The State requests a 
blanket prohibition of felons having any association or employment 
of any kind with these agencies. That is not the law as the 
Legislature wrote it. Felons like Shaun Sorenson are entitled to 
a hearing and a determination whether they provide child care 
services before their employment is prohibited. The trial court 
gave him that hearing and approved his employment. This Court 
should uphold and affirm that action. 
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